



















DRUID Working Paper No. 05-10 
 
 
























Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Department of Business Administration 
Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid) - Spain 
E-mail: andrea.fosfuri@uc3m.es 
 
Marco S. Giarratana  
 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Department of Business Administration 





Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Department of Business Administration 
Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid) - Spain 
E-mail: alessandra.luzzi@uc3m.es 
 
First Version: March 2005 




Open source software (OSS) has recently emerged as a new way to organize innovation and product 
development in the software industry. This paper investigates the factors that explain the investment 
of profit-oriented firms in OSS products. Drawing on the resource-based theory of the firm, we 
focus on the role played by pre-OSS firm assets both upstream and downstream, in the software and 
the hardware dimensions, to explain the rate of product introduction in OSS. Using a self-assembled 
database of firms that have announced releases of OSS products during the period 1995-2003, we 
find that the intensity of product introduction can be explained by a strong position in software 
technology and downstream market presence in hardware. Firms with consolidated market presence 
in proprietary software and strong technological competences in hardware are more reluctant to 
shift to the new paradigm. The evidence is stronger for operating systems than for applications. The 
fear of cannibalization, the crucial role of absorptive capacity, and complementarities between 
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There are no official and fully reliable data on the diffusion of open source software 
(OSS) products. However, both anecdotal evidence and experts’ assessments seem to 
suggest that OSS development is a phenomenon with a tangible impact on the 
competitive dynamics of the overall software industry (Lerner and Tirole, 2002).
1 
OSS development constitutes a new form to organize innovation and software 
code writing. Whereas proprietary software production is a rather carefully planned 
activity supervised by an influential management, OSS production arises from the 
interactions of loosely related developers organized in a thousand seemingly 
independent projects (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). At the heart of OSS is an 
attached license, which abandons essential rights granted to the original creator by 
copyright law. This procedure gives anyone the opportunity to redistribute and modify 
any received OSS. Most importantly, the source code of the software must be 
distributed as well or be available at reasonable reproduction cost, although the license 
must not demand any condition on the software product distributed along with the 
licensed software code. These characteristics sharply contrast with the existing model of 
proprietary software, where firms aggressively protect their source codes and use 
licenses that deprive users of the chance to share and modify the underlying code. 
Although OSS development has been around for many years, it is only in the last 
decade that it has become a sizable phenomenon within the software industry. OSS 
initiatives have attracted both praise and criticism by software-related firms. On one 
side, Microsoft has identified OSS as an IPR destroyer. In the words of Jim Allchin, 
Windows Operating systems Chief Product Manager, “Open-source is an intellectual 
property destroyer. I can't imagine something worse than this for the software business 
and the intellectual property business. […] I don't think we've done enough education of 
policymakers to understand the threat of open source software” (BusinessWire, 2001). 
On the other side, companies such as IBM, HP, Sun, Red Hat, Oracle and Novell, have 
                                                 
 
1 For instance, GNU/Linux (an open source operating system) has already a consolidated position in the 
server market. In particular, the Apache web server dominates its product category. A 2004 
InformationWeek survey found that 67% of companies use OSS products, with another 16% expecting to 
use it in 2005; only 17% have no near-term plans to support OSS products.  In the browser market, 
Internet Explorer is loosing ground vis-à-vis open source alternatives like Firefox or Opera. In the 




recently invested in, and legitimized the use of Linux for enterprise applications 
(Koenig, 2004).  
The growing interest in OSS development has not passed unobserved to the 
economic and management literature. Many scholars have directed their attention to the 
way in which OSS communities work. In particular a lot of effort has been put in 
understanding how rewards are assigned within OSS projects and the incentive structure 
of the developers when the results of individual efforts are immediately available to the 
public domain (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2002). Other 
research has focused on the stability and the social benefits of the open source model for 
generating innovation and ideas (Dalle and David, 2005; Gambardella and Hall, 2005). 
Recent work has looked into the organization of OSS projects and the internal 
assignment of roles and tasks (Giuri et al. 2004). 
This paper takes a rather different approach and investigates the factors that 
explain the investment of profit-oriented corporations in OSS products. In this respect, 
we aim at providing new (and most likely first) empirical evidence on two related 
questions that Lerner and Tirole (2001: 821) have posed: What are the strategies of 
profit-oriented firms with respect to the OSS movement? And, what is the relationship 
between OSS business models and the innovative process driven by patents and 
copyrights? Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of empirical 
research on this facet, and most of the evidence we are aware of is only anecdotal 
(Lerner and Tirole, 2001 and 2002). This spare empirical research does not stand for a 
lack of interest. On the contrary, as we sketched above, the OSS phenomenon starts 
having profound effects on the software industry and will soon condition firms’ 
strategies and the locus of competitive advantage. In our view, not only it is an issue 
with a strong practical relevance, but also it represents an important research topic, 
since investment in OSS products raises the natural question of how firms profit from 
product introductions in an environment with different rules and conditions. We resort 
to the resource-based theory of the firm (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993) to assert that 
differences in the resources available to firms explain different patterns of investment in 
OSS products.  
The underlying theoretical background of this paper is borrowed from the 
population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) and the organization behavior 
(Levinthal and March, 1993) traditions. These scholars posit that, when faced with a 




change. Under these circumstances, some resources are critical to guarantee the returns 
from the investment the firm needs to activate in order to adapt or change, while others 
might hinder the firm’s movement into the new competitive arena.  
We focus, in particular, on the role played by downstream (market presence) and 
upstream (technological competences) firm resources both in the software and hardware 
dimensions to explain the rate of product introductions in OSS. Indeed, as suggested by 
Teece (1986), when IPRs are weak and the underlying knowledge base is codified, 
firms can only rely on the control of complementary downstream assets to guarantee the 
appropriation of their investment in new products. In addition, since OSS can be viewed 
as a repository of public-good knowledge, absorptive capacity dictates the firm’s ability 
to identify, assimilate, transform and exploit information that is present outside its own 
boundaries. In turn, upstream (technological) assets are critical to assess the level of 
firm absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Zahra 
and George, 2002). 
We prove these theories with a self-assembled dataset of firms that have 
announced releases of OSS products on the specialized press. As mentioned before, 
although much has been already said about the OSS movement, very little attention has 
been devoted to understand how profit-oriented firms cope with this new paradigm for 
software production. Our unique dataset allows us to precisely uncover this lacuna. The 
dataset is rather comprehensive and tracks down all OSS product introductions from 
1995 to 2003, classifying them in two major niches: operating systems and applications. 
From this source, there are no OSS products released by profit-oriented firms prior to 
1995. During the period under scrutiny, we fidn that 461 different companies have 
introduced at least one software product based on an OSS scheme.  
Our results show that the intensity of product introduction in OSS can be 
explained by a strong upstream position in proprietary software technology and a 
significant market presence downstream in hardware. By contrast, firms with strong 
market presence in proprietary software and good technological competences in 
hardware are more reluctant to shift to the new paradigm. The evidence is stronger for 
operating systems than applications. We shall argue below that the fear of 
cannibalization, the crucial role of absorptive capacity, and complementarities between 
hardware and software are plausible explanations behind our findings. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the 




data, the empirical methodology and the variables used in our regressions. Section 4 
shows our results. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications of our findings, 
directions for future research and major limitations of our work. 
 
 
Theory background and hypotheses 
 
Our theory grounds on the idea that pre-existing assets affect the direction and pace of 
firm change and adaptation (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Levinthal and March, 1993). 
As stated in the Introduction, OSS development has recently emerged as a new 
paradigm in the software industry. Painting it with a broad brush, OSS could be 
represented as an exogenous shock that hits the industry, and forces firms to respond. 
Under this scenario, the link between firm resources and competitive achievements is 
not straightforward. As population ecologists (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Amburgey 
et al., 1993) and organization behaviorists (Levinthal and March, 1993; Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000) pointed out, only some of the existing firm assets favor the firm’s 
positioning in a new environment. 
Indeed, the actual stock of firm resources is the product of several factors, such 
as initial endowments, research trajectories, path dependence, that are mostly exogenous 
to the new conditions (Winter, 1987; Dosi, 1988). Given the new market features, some 
firms will find easy to adapt and exploit the new opportunities, while others will be 
forced to activate further investments to acquire the lacking resources. What is more, in 
some cases the acquisition of new resources could threaten the firm’s existing assets and 
competences (Danneels, 2004). As Gatignon et al. (2002) suggested, adapting 
mechanisms and the efficacy of time-to-market strategies could be seriously 
undermined by some existing organizational rigidities generated by the current core 
competences. Hence, the pre-OSS asset portfolio could affect not only firm ability to 
extract rents from the new opportunities, but also the ability to organize a reliable 
business model. This is even more important in a market where the time of entry plays 
an important role in terms of first mover advantages, reputation building and network 
externalities. 
With this premise in place, in an environment characterized by a low IPRs 
regime and large availability of public-good knowledge, we focus on co-specialized 




technological assets (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002) - as key 
drivers of firm investments in OSS products. 
The seminal work of David Teece represents a milestone to assess the firm’s 
ability to profit from innovation activity (Teece, 1986). A crucial factor to understand 
such ability is the strength of the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Under 
tight appropriability regimes, the innovator is more likely to turn its innovative effort 
into a sustainable competitive advantage. By contrast, under weak appropriability 
regimes, where the menace of imitation is high, it is the presence of co-specialized 
assets (services, distribution channels, customers’ loyalty, etc.) that allows the firm to 
protect the flow of rents generated by its innovation activity. “If innovation is not tightly 
protected […] then securing the control of complementary capacities is likely to be the 
key success factor” (Teece, 1986: 37).  
In this respect, OSS is the quintessential example of a low IPRs regime. Indeed, 
under different licensing schemes, open source implies the free access to the software 
source code, which deprives firms of a classical protection tool of proprietary software, 
i.e. code secrecy. So, a new OSS product cannot be in itself a source of a sustainable 
competitive advantage because it is easily imitable (Winter, 1987; Barney, 1991). All in 
all, this implies that only by focusing on the co-specialized assets we can understand 
firms’ behavior in this new environment. This analysis also echoes the tradition of 
population ecologists. According to Hannan and Freeman (1984), marketing strategies 
is one of the most important factors that should be scrutinized to value the ability of 
firms to adapt in new environments.  
Moreover, under a different perspective, the firm’s existing knowledge base 
affects the ability to absorb, transform and utilize external information (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002). Van den Bosch et al. (1999) have 
emphasized how absorptive capacity is the key factor to firm success, especially when 
most of the valuable knowledge resides in the external environment. Absorptive 
capacity is even more important in OSS since information is freely available and 
diffused among the community of users, developers and practitioners. Theoretically, 
since all firms have access to the same potential pool of external technological 
knowledge, the ability to learn and utilize it should discriminate the profit opportunities 
and the corresponding investments. In fact, the extent to which firms leverage the 
technological information available at the OSS community level may vary significantly 




In synthesis, given the salient characteristics of the OSS milieu, we aim at 
predicting the patterns of firm investments in OSS products through the pre-existing 
firm endowment of downstream and upstream resources. In so doing, due to the 
systemic nature of most IT products where hardware and software components are 
closely intertwined, we distinguish in our analysis between firm assets along these two 
dimensions. Table 1 summarizes our theoretical framework.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Downstream position in software. Firms that are using profitable business 
models in proprietary software face a higher risk of product cannibalization by moving 
to OSS products. Mitchell and Singh (1992) have argued that the fear of product 
cannibalization prevents firms from investing in emerging and new markets. Typically, 
profits from new products are uncertain, and the firm is less willing to threaten stable 
existing rent streams with risky investments (Conner, 1988).  In the same vein, the 
industrial organization tradition has looked at the incentive to innovate of an established 
monopolist vis-à-vis a new entrant. The incumbent has fewer incentives to introduce 
new products because it also accounts for the erosion of profits in the existing lines of 
business (Arrow, 1962; Reiganum, 1981). In turn, this implies that the larger is the level 
of irreversible investments in downstream assets, the higher is the probability of 
cannibalization and the most likely firms will activate wait-and-see strategies.  
On top of cannibalization, existing downstream assets might generate rigidities 
that make slow and unsuccessful the adjustment towards new business models. A rather 
common case is a product introduction that requires a modification of the established 
selling methods. Christensen (1997) points out that when the vendor’s systems are not 
functional to the new markets, the firm’s ability to exploit rent opportunities might be 
seriously undermined. This happens even if the firm owns all the technological 
resources required. OSS products are usually downloaded directly from customers or 
uploaded directly by hardware producers. This makes more difficult for firms 
specialized in proprietary software to adjust their selling practices, typically based on 
networks of distributors. In a journal interview, the same view was expressed by the 
research director of Gartner, a consultancy firm specialized in high tech sectors: 




channels and cannot compete with direct selling and support models [as in Linux]” 
(Entrepreneur, 2002: 40).  
Moreover, it could be that not only the vendor channels are different but also the 
type of customers. This is extremely important especially in software, where linkages 
with users and customers usually increase product performance (software debugging) 
and help firms in better tailoring products to user needs (Von Hippel, 1998 and 2001). 
User needs in software are evolving at a rapid pace and the literature has already 
discussed how the OSS users are intrinsically different from the traditional customers of 
proprietary software (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2001). OSS buyers are more 
sophisticated users, sometimes participants of software communities of code compilers. 
They demand less standardized products with the option to directly fix problems and 
bugs without any external assistance from post-sale services. Traditional software 
vendors are not again in a favorable position if the evolution of the market is shaped by 
this new type of costumers that demand products with a major interaction between the 
user and the program code. Again Christensen (1997) highlights how firms usually 
focus and invest in satisfying established costumers in existing markets to whom they 
made strategic commitments (see also Ghemawat, 1991). This is especially true for 
software programs that manage money flows and transactions. The crash of such 
software systems might require immediate problem fixing and therefore the user might 
ask a direct access to the software code (PCWeek, 1999). User demand of a direct and 
quick control of the software code creates a new need that is not easily addressed 
through traditional software vendor systems. These considerations lead to our first 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A stronger downstream position in proprietary software will hamper the 
exploitation of OSS opportunities. 
 
Downstream position in hardware. Firms that own important downstream assets 
in hardware are in the opposite situation. First of all, absent any severe menace of 
product cannibalization, they could exploit network externalities generated by the 
interaction between the software packages and the number of hardware machines sold. 
The literature has already stressed the positive relationship between software products 
and hardware machines, being the latter the channel through which network 




product may depend in part on the installed base, especially in the initial phase of 
product introductions and in the presence of standard battles (Shapiro and Varian, 1998; 
Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1998; Gandal et al., 1999). The history of the success of the 
DOS paradigm over Macintosh is usually explained by the fact that the largest PC 
producer, IBM, chose the former as the standard operating systems to provide along 
with its machines. Therefore, a strong hardware downstream position confers an 
invaluable advantage to exploit this network effect.  
The support of hardware vendors for OSS products might also be interpreted as 
an attempt to reduce the bargaining power of specialized suppliers of proprietary 
software. But in our view this is not a sufficient condition, since it does not explain why 
the hardware sellers should invest in producing their own software products instead of 
buying cheap OSS packages from specialized firms. Part of this puzzle can be explained 
by the advantage that hardware vendors have in customizing OSS solutions to their 
machines, and the overall bundle to the customers’ needs. Customization is the avenue 
to increase product differentiation that usually leads to higher prices and margins 
(Dewan et al., 2003). The larger is the installed base on which the firm can spread the 
cost of customization, the higher will be the advantage of this strategy. “One advantage 
we have [with Linux] is that our solution is very customizable and can be tailored” says 
Mark Douglas, president of Hyperic, a spin-off of the server producer Covalent 
Technologies (Computer Reseller News, 2004b). Moreover, Peter Balckmore at H&P 
Enterprise System Group affirmed: “we will significantly broaden the scope of our 
Linux offering, providing costumers […] to take advantage of the low cost, reliability 
and scalability” (Business Wire, 2002: 448).  
Another possible argument could be that hardware producers prefer in-house 
production because the outside market of specialized OSS vendors is under-developed 
and it would be too risky in the long run to rely on outsourcing. In the jargon of the 
industry this is known as “patronizing strategy”. By backing OSS initiatives hardware 
producers ignite the development of OSS products from which they will eventually 
benefit. The recent acquisition of SUSE by Novell can be reinterpreted in this direction. 
“We are young and small and Novell's global research, marketing expertise and 
reputation for security, reliability and global enterprise-level support are exactly what 
we've been seeking to take SUSE LINUX to the next level” commented Richard Seibt, 
CEO of SUSE (PR Newswire, 2003).  





Hypothesis 2: A stronger downstream position in hardware will favor the exploitation 
of OSS opportunities. 
 
Upstream position in software. In an industry characterized by a fast pace of 
innovation and product-based competition like software, technological capabilities are a 
key source of competitive advantages (Torrisi, 1998). However, the role of 
technological capabilities takes an interesting twist in OSS. Indeed, in OSS, most of the 
valuable information resides in the community of users, developers and practitioners 
that continuously shapes and modifies the nature and the structure of the software 
projects (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). Hence, firm technological capabilities are 
only marginally employed for the internal generation of new knowledge flows. By 
contrast, the availability of a large stock of technological capabilities helps not only the 
acquisition and assimilation of relevant external information but also to build the ability 
to exploit it (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Indeed, mere exposure to external knowledge 
is not sufficient to internalize it successfully (Pennings and Harianto, 1992). 
This is especially important when most of the valuable information resides 
outside the firm’s boundaries. As stated by Van de Bosch et al. (1999), the need to 
increase firm absorptive capacity is more imperative in highly demanding knowledge 
environments. Hence, firms in such environments are more likely to exert effort and 
invest additional resources to increase their level of absorptive capacity (Van de Bosch 
et al., 1999). 
The search and use of new knowledge is a localized and path-dependent process 
(Winter, 1987; Dosi, 1988; Levinthal and March, 1993). Knowledge accumulation is 
mostly cumulative, with new knowledge components rooted on the existing knowledge 
base, long jumps are very rare, and technological competences most often only improve 
incrementally. Similarly, absorptive capacity is a function of the actual firm knowledge 
base that influences firm receptivity to seek, recognize and transform external 
information (Zahra and George 2002; Song et al., 2003). Learning and efficient 
absorption of external knowledge requires similar cognitive structures, common skills 
and shared languages. When the existing and the acquired knowledge bases contain 
elements of similarity, the knowledge integration process, through assimilation and 




repository of software competences will be better positioned to benefit from the 
knowledge available at the level of OSS communities. 
This ability to identify, assimilate, transform and exploit external knowledge is 
especially important for those firms who want to accelerate the time to market of their 
software products. Since time to market and first mover advantages are often crucial in 
the first stages of an industry, stronger software technological competences could give 
firms an additional strategic variable: The ability to speed up the absorption of 
knowledge residing in the communities of users, developers and practitioners, and to 
exploit time-based competition.  
 
Hypothesis 3: A stronger position in software technology will favor the exploitation of 
OSS opportunities. 
 
Upstream position in hardware. Technological competences in hardware have 
not a clear-cut effect on the firm’s ability to exploit OSS opportunities. In supporting 
this argument, we follow Zahra and George (2002) who suggest that absorptive capacity 
is a multidimensional construct that impinges at different times on different capabilities 
and routines. Specifically, they point out the existence of two sub-sets of absorptive 
capacity: potential and realized. Potential absorptive capacity enables a firm’s 
receptiveness to external knowledge, and defines the boundaries to the amount of 
external information the firm can identify and assimilate; realized absorptive capacity 
reflects a firm’s ability to leverage absorbed knowledge and transform it into innovation 
outcome. A similar characterization was advocated by Arora and Gambardella (1994), 
who distinguished between the ability to evaluate external knowledge and the ability to 
exploit it, and it is also implicit in Cohen and Levinthal (1990)’s contribution.  
We argue below that the relationship between hardware competences and 
absorptive capacity can only be understood by analyzing separately potential and 
realized absorptive capacity. Indeed, on the one hand, hardware competences could 
generate positive technological synergies with the software component thereby 
improving the firm’s ability to transform and exploit externally available software 
knowledge (i.e. its realized absorptive capacity); on the other hand, hardware 
competences could harm the firm’s ability to identify and assimilate external software 




Indeed, a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of a hardware machine could 
help build up better algorithms and software architectures, using at best the information 
coming from the environment. Hardware competences should allow “encapsulating 
hardware and software resources in a unique component” (Electronic Engineering Time, 
1999). Put it differently, a better understanding of the machine can be exploited through 
software products that closely match the idiosyncrasies of the underlying hardware. 
However, the relatedness of the knowledge base is an important factor to set the 
boundaries of the amount of external information the firm is able to scan and absorb 
(Ahuja and Katila 2001). Hardware competences are more distant to the potential pool 
of information available in the OSS communities compared to software competences. 
Moreover, there exists a big difference in terms of technological languages between 
hardware and software engineers. The specialized press usually refers to a hardware-
software trade-off to capture this difference (Electronic Engineering Time, 1999). 
Strong hardware background could sometimes generate difficulties in coping with the 
fast changing best-practices in software code writing (Kasser and Shoshany, 2000).  
In sum, hardware competences can help writing software that increases the 
quality of the final joint product, thanks to the hardware-software co-design, but they 
lower the firm’s ability to identify and assimilate valuable information available in the 
OSS community. This is particularly true for some software niches where hardware 
components and software code quality are critical, such as videogames (Computer 
Graphics World, 2004).  
 
Hypothesis 4: A stronger position in hardware technology has an ambiguous effect on 
the exploitation of OSS opportunities. 
 
Data and methodology 
The sample  
Our sample is composed by the firms that have announced on the specialized press the 
introduction of a software package based on Open Source architectures between 1980 
and 2003. Product introduction data were taken from Infotrac's General Business File 
ASAP and PROMT databases that, from a large set of trade journals, magazines and 
other specialized press, report several categories of “events” classified by industrial 
sectors. We searched for all press articles that reported a “Product announcement", a 




7372, software) and that contained in the text of the article the words “open source” or 
“linux”. After carefully controlling that we were only picking up OSS products, we 
extracted from each article the name of the company and the date of product 
introduction (month and year). We found that the first announcement of an OSS product 
was in May 1995.  
Using the information on the SIC codes, we divided the OSS products in two 
main niches: the operating systems, OPSYS (SIC Codes 737261 and 737250) and the 
applications, APP (6 digit SIC Codes other than -61 and -50). When the SIC code was 
only available at 4 digits, the text of the article was carefully inspected in order to 
distinguish between the two niches. To give an example, the SUSE Linux was classified 
under the OPSYS category while the Matlab version for Linux was classified in APP. 
This distinction is quite important since we want to track potential differences in the 
drivers of firm investment in the two niches. As a matter of fact, the literature (Gandal 
et al., 1999) has stressed that success in operating systems is more directly linked to 
hardware synergies and network effects, while for applications the key variables are 
innovation and software efficiency in accomplishing the assigned tasks. 
We controlled for sample firm group structure using information from the 
Business and Company Resource Center database, Gale Group's Infotrac. We ended up 
with 213 different entrants in the APP niche, which introduced 360 different products, 
and 320 different entrants in the OPSYS niche, which introduced 877 different 
products. Since 72 firms entered both niches, the total number of entrants in the OSS 
market is 461.
2 The firm level data used in our analysis were recovered from Bureau 
van Dijk’s Icarus, Amadeus and Jade databases, for American, European and Asian 
firms respectively. Table 2 reports our sample of firms classified according to their core 
sector of activity. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Empirical model 
                                                 
2 Entry is here defined using the announcement of an OSS product. Of course, there can be cases in which 
the firm has announced a product but it was not afterwards commercialized or, although the product was 
introduced, it did not attract demand and was immediately shelved. This might end up introducing some 
measurement problem in our dependent variable. Unless such measurement error is correlated with our 




The sample described before suffers from a sample selection problem because we do 
not observe firms that did not introduce any OSS product before December 2003. To 
control for this problem, we built up a control sample. In particular, firms belonging to 
the control group were randomly selected from Bureau Van Dijk’s Icarus for North 
American firms, Amadeus for European firms and Jade for Asian firms, using the 
precise country (Japan, Germany, UK, Canada …) and sector (3 digit SIC code) 
composition of the original sample as matching criteria between cases and controls. The 
total dimension of the original sample was replicated for the control sample in both the 
APP and OPSYS niches. 
Conditional on the fact that a firm actually introduced a product in OSS, the 
number of product introductions can then be estimated by nonlinear least squares 
(Terza, 1995). Specifically, considering both the firms in the original sample and in the 
control group, we assume that the observed number of product introductions in OSS, 
i y , follows a Poisson distribution conditional on an error term that is normally 
distributed:  i i y ε |~ Poisson() i λ , where  i ε ∼ ) , 0 (
2 σ N . Its log-mean can thus be 
modeled as a linear function of our covariates and controls,  i x , plus the error term i ε :   
( ) i i i i i i i x x y E ε β ε λ ε + = =
' | ln , | ln . 
The normal error term in this specification allows taking into account 
unobserved heterogeneity, which is not modeled in the standard Poisson specification 
where the mean of the distribution of  i y  is equal to the variance and all of the 
heterogeneity is accounted for in the vector of covariates i x
3.  
We then address the sample selection through a Probit specification where our 
dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm actually introduced an OSS 
product and 0 otherwise. This choice can be modeled as: 


 > + =
=
otherwise







where  i w  are the covariates used to explain the decision to enter or to not enter with a 
an OSS product,  i u ∼ ) 1 , 0 ( N  and the two error terms ( ) i i u , ε  have a bivariate normal 
                                                 
3 The more common way to model heterogeneity in the Poisson model is to re-specify the unconditional 
distribution for yi as a negative binomial (hypothesizing the error term εi  in the conditional Poisson 
distribution of  i i y ε |  to have a gamma (1,ξ) distribution). Unfortunately, this formulation does not 




distribution with covariance  ρσ θ = . The correlation term ρ  between the errors in the 
two specifications allows us to take into account unobserved factors that may influence 
both the decision to enter with a product and the decision of how many products to 
launch, thus solving the selectivity problem. 
Under this framework, the mean of the number of product introductions 
conditional on  1 = i d  can be specified as (see Terza, 1995): 
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where Φ is the cumulative function of a standardized normal distribution.
4 Notice that, 
even if the actual distribution of  1 , | = i i i d x y  is unknown, the coefficients in the 
conditional mean function can be estimated by non-linear least squares. Consistent 
estimates are obtained estimating the full model with a two–steps procedure, where the 
parameters  α  in the Probit specification are first estimated on the whole number of 
observations in the sample and in the control sample. Then, the parameters β  and θ  are 
estimated with least squares on the sub-sample of firms that actually introduced a 
product. We use a heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator for the asymptotic covariance 
matrix (Murphy and Topel, 1985) of the estimates of the second step.  
To control for potential differences, we run two separated estimations for the 




Our unit of observation is the firm. The dependent variable in the second step estimation 
is the number of new OSS packages (or new versions of already launched OSS 
products) announced by the firm from its first OSS product to December 2003. This 
variable aims, first, at capturing the intensity of firm investment in OSS products. All 
things being equal, the number of products launched, Ni, is usually directly influenced 
by the level of investment: Ni=f(Ii) with f’ >0. The literature has shown that in a patent 
production function the number of patented innovations is highly correlated to the 
investment in R&D (Hausman et al., 1984). Second, since we are analyzing firms’ 
investments at the beginning of a new paradigm, the intensity of product introductions 
could also signal the intention of the firm to “rush” into the market in order to benefit 
                                                 
4 The constant term 
0 β estimated in this specification is actually equal to  2 /
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from lead time, first mover advantages, reputation building and cycle time. In this 
respect, the literature has pointed out that when analyzing time to market we should 
acknowledge first the firm’s recognition of potential time advantages (and not all firms 
have it) and then its ability to organize the production to exploit them (Harter et al., 
2000). 
 
Independent variables and controls 
Firm upstream positions in software and hardware are measured through the firm stock 
of patents. This is a rather common and well-accepted indicator employed in the 
innovation literature. For instance, several works both from the industrial organization 
and the management traditions have used firm patent stock to proxy for R&D 
cumulative expertise and knowledge, technological ability and absorptive capacity 
(Henderson and Cockburn, 1993; Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Silverman, 1999; 
McGrath and Nerkar, 2004). “A patent, by definition, represents a unique and novel 
element of knowledge. A set of patents then represents a collection of discrete, distinct 
units of knowledge. Identifying a set of patents that a firm has demonstrated familiarity 
with […] can be a basis for identifying the revealed knowledge base of a firm” (Ahuja 
and Katila 2001: 201). Specifically, we proxy the firm’s pre-entry technological assets 
in software and hardware with the stock of patents granted in these two technological 
fields at the US Patent and Trademark Office the month before the firm’s announcement 
of its first OSS product. We label these two covariates: PATENTSOFT and 
PATENTHARD. In order to classify patents in the two categories, we utilized search 
algorithms in the abstract of the patent. We report in the Appendix the detailed 
explanation of these search algorithms. 
We apply a similar procedure to measure firm pre-entry downstream assets. We 
utilize the firm’s “live” stock of trademarks filed at USPTO the month before the firm’s 
first announcement of OSS product introduction. Trademarks are a good proxy for the 
firm’s downstream position. With a sample of 237 COMPUSTAT firms from the period 
1995-1998, Seethamraju (2003) reports a highly significant empirical association 
between trademarks and sales. Trademarks are combinations of “words, phrases, 




one party from those of others” (USPTO Documentation, http://tess.uspto.gov).
5 Firms 
can register as a trademark a new brand, a jingle or a slogan, a new image or a logo. 
Trademarks are extremely important especially in software. An emblematic case is the 
court battle that Microsoft has filed against Lindows.com for the use of the trademarks 
“Lindows”, “Lindows.com” and “LindowsOS” that according to Microsoft infringed 
several Microsoft trademarks. The court not only agreed in prohibiting the use of these 
trademarks but also assigned a penalty of about 350,000 Euros (PR Newswire, 2003). 
In order to distinguish between software and hardware trademarks we have 
applied to the front page of the trademark search algorithms similar to the ones used for 
patents (see the Appendix). We then created two variables: TRADEMARKSOFT and 
TRADEMARKHARD, i.e. the pre-entry number of “live” trademarks filed by the firm 
up to the month before its first announcement of an OSS product in software and in 
hardware respectively. 
For the firms in the control sample, we take trademark and patent stocks at 
December 2003. 
We also consider a set of control variables in our estimations. First, we want to 
account for the fact that firms that have entered the OSS market earlier have more time 
to launch products during the sample period. TIME2MKT is thus defined as the number 
of months that elapsed between the firm’s entry (i.e. its first OSS product) and the end 
of the period, December 2003. Even if, by definition, this variable is highly correlated 
with the dependent variable, our aim is to test the significance of the covariates of 
theoretical interest beyond the explanatory power of TIME2MKT.  
Second, we control for firm size and age. EMPL is the number of firm 
employees and AGE is the firm age (measured in years) at the date of the first OSS 
product announcement. Data were taken from Bureau van Dijk’s Icarus, Amadeus and 
Jade. These are standard controls in the entry and survival literature (Klepper, 2002), 
and could be interpreted as proxies for firm scale and experience. Size is especially 
important to scale down the stock of firm assets (patents and trademarks).  
Third, to control for core sector differences, we introduce five dummies that 
group firms with the same core businesses. The sector dummies are HARDWARE (SIC 
code 357), SOFTWARE (737), ELECTRONICS (36 except for 367 and 366), 
                                                 
5 The US trademark owners pay different types of fees for each class of goods/services for which a 
trademark is registered, and they have to prove periodically that they are using the trademark in the US 




SEMICONDUCTORS (367) and TELECOMMUNICATIONS (366).  Firm core sectors 
were similarly taken from Bureau van Dijk’s databases (3 digit SIC codes). Hardware 
and software dummies are especially important because the effect of upstream and 
downstream software and hardware assets will be potentially significant beyond these 
controls, i.e. taken two hardware firms, the one with more trademarks in hardware will 
invest more in OSS opportunities.  
Fourth, we introduce two geographical dummies, EUROPE for the European 
firms, and ASIA for the Asian firms. The baseline is an American firm. 
Finally, since we run separate estimations for the two niches (APP and 
OPSYST) and 72 firms announced product introductions in both, we want to control for 
the fact that firms that have already entered one niche might have a substantially 
different rate of product releases in the other niche. Therefore, when we estimate our 
regression for the OPSYST niche, we introduce a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has 
introduced a software application before the introduction of the first operating system, 
and zero otherwise. This variable is labeled APPBEFORE. Similarly, for the APP niche, 
we create OPSYSTBEFORE, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has 
introduced a product in the operating systems niche before the first product introduction 
in applications. The logic of these dummies grounds on previous studies that have found 
positive and strong feedbacks between applications and operating systems. Comparing 
DOS and CP/M products, Gandal et al. (1999) highlight that applications make 
operating systems more valuable, and that the reverse relationship also holds (operating 
systems increase the value of applications). Following these findings, a firm that has 
entered in both niches should benefit of some sort of advantage in releasing new 
software products. Moreover, these two dummies represent our best proxies to capture 
for potential product bundling strategies, since we do not have any information on 
whether these products are sold in a unique package or separately. 
The variables measuring firm pre-entry technological and downstream assets 
were used in both the first and the second stage estimation. The same was done for our 
measure of size and for sector and country dummies. The variables OPSYSTBEFORE, 
APPSYSTBEFORE and TIME2MKT were obviously considered only in the second 
step estimation on the sub-sample of firms that entered the OSS market. Finally, the 
variable AGE was used only to explain firm decision to enter with a product.
6   
                                                 
6 We do not have any strong theory on the covariates of the first step estimation that we interpret only as a 




Table 3 shows the basic descriptive statistics for our independent variables and 
controls in the two niches for the sample and the control sample of firms. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Results 
Table 4 shows the results of our estimations. In particular, this table reports the 
estimation results of the second step non-linear least squares regression, that is, the 
effect of our covariates on the frequency of product introductions based on OSS 
architectures. Figure 1 and 2 depict the number of predicted product introductions 
according to the variations from the minimum to the maximum of our core variables, all 
other variables held at their mean values. 
First, we discuss the effect of firm pre-entry assets on the number of product 
introductions in the operating systems niche. Next, we show how substantial differences 
can be observed for the applications niche, and provide a tentative explanation for this 
finding. 
First of all, notice that most of the covariates of theoretical interest show up a 
significant effect.  
In accordance with our first hypothesis, the stronger the downstream position in 
proprietary software, the less the firm will invest in OSS operating systems. Though 
significant at 1% level, the negative effect of the pre-entry stock of software trademarks 
on the number of product introductions is low in magnitude, as the model prediction in 
figure 1.a shows.  
The effect of a stronger downstream position in hardware goes in the opposite 
direction, showing a positive and significant effect on the number of product 
introductions in the OPSYS niche. Contrary to the previous case, the magnitude of the 
effect is more relevant. This finding conforms to our hypothesis 2. 
The pre-entry position in software technology also enhances the exploitation of 
OSS opportunities, supporting our third hypothesis. In the fourth hypothesis we 
predicted an ambiguous effect of pre-entry technological competences in hardware. The 
results highlight that these assets slow down the frequency of product introductions, but 
once again with a small effect in terms of magnitude (figure 1.b). These latter findings 
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support the conjecture that absorptive capacity is crucial to identify, assimilate, 
transform and exploit the repository of knowledge available at the level of OSS 
communities. In this respect, while firm software resources clearly favor both the 
potential and realized absorptive capacity, hardware knowledge has a negative impact 
on the former and a positive on the latter. Theoretically, the net effect is ambiguous. 
Empirically, our results show that the negative impact on potential absorptive capacity 
prevails. We think that the strong positive sign of PATENTSOFT and the slightly 
negative coefficient of PATENTHARD are in line with this interpretation.  
Apart from the negative impact of the pre-entry stock of software trademarks, 
firm pre-entry assets do not seem to have a significant role on the frequency of product 
introduction in the application niche.
7 Firm pre-entry position in hardware shows an 
effect only in a model without the OPSYSBEFORE control (Table 4-(2)). The factor 
that seems to explain most of the intensity of product launching in the APP niche is 
indeed whether the firm had previously entered the operating systems niche or not. As 
illustrated in Figure 2, firms that have entered the operating systems niche before 
launching the first OSS product in applications show a higher release rate in this niche. 
These findings suggest that in the APP niche firms that have already introduced 
operating system products are more active players. This offers a rather coherent picture 
of the overall firm’s behavior: In the operating systems the pre-entry assets are clear-cut 
drivers of the firm’s incentives to invest (or not) in OSS opportunities, while in the 
applications the role of firm assets is shadowed by firm previous entry in the operating 
systems niche. This picture is consistent with an initial stage of the OSS market, where - 
lacking an established and reliable set of application producers - firms that want to 
launch operating systems are in some way “forced” to release in-house applications in 
order to increase the value of their OSS operating systems. Earlier studies on the 
software industry (see for instance, Gandal et al., 1999) have demonstrated how the 
success of an operating systems paradigm is intrinsically associated with the availability 
of a large portfolio of applications that could be run on that software base. This recalls 
the patronizing strategies that some firms pursue: By backing OSS applications they 
increase the value of OSS operating systems. This vision is confirmed by the words of 
Rich Severa, president of MOCA, a Sun Microsystems’ division focused on OSS 
                                                 
7 Notice, however, that the signs of our core covariates go all in the correct direction, although given the 
high standard errors they are not significant. For the APP niche we have a smaller number of 




products: “The greater value-added your software product has, as perceived by your 
potential customers, the more difficult it is for competitors to win business away from 
you. Accordingly, one of the best ways to create and sustain a profitable business is to 
be focused on your value-added rather than your product. When potential customers 
readily see the additional value in what you offer in terms of meeting their needs, it is 
easier to make the sale while keeping your prices and profits higher. With Linux we're 
not looking to jump into a new segment of customer that wants to buy everything. If we 
can add more opportunities to end users with patronizing, that's fine” (Computer 
Reseller News, 2002). 
Concerning our main control covariates, TIME2MKT is significant as expected, 
suggesting that the firm that have entered before launch more OSS products. Also SIZE 
is significant and positive, indicating that a scale effect is at work here. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Drawing on the resource-based theory of the firm (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993), this 
paper has investigated which assets explain the rate of product introductions by profit-
oriented organizations in OSS. OSS development constitutes a new form to organize 
innovation and software code writing, whose impact on the overall software industry 
has become particularly sizable in the second half of the 90s. Mirrored in a new 
competitive scenario, firms have been forced to react through adaptation and change. 
Following a consolidated tradition both from organization behavior (Lenvinthal and 
March 1993; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000) and population ecology (Hannan and Freeman 
1984), we have argued that the pre-OSS firm assets play a crucial role in shaping the 
incentives and the ability to make inroads into the new competitive arena.  
OSS has two key features, which we have tried to accommodate within our 
theory. First, it is par excellence an environment with weak IPRs. This, in addition to 
the highly codified nature of software knowledge, makes appropriability of innovation 
efforts an important concern for firms (Teece, 1986). Second, OSS communities can be 
viewed as repositories of public-good knowledge. Since everybody is entitled to access 
and use such external stock of knowledge, it is the ability to identify, assimilate, 
transform and exploit it that generates heterogeneity across firms. Absorptive capacity is 
therefore a key source of competitive advantages in OSS (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
These two features of OSS have motivated our focus on downstream and upstream 




This paper contributes to the literature on innovation management and 
absorptive capacity in several ways.  
First, our results point out to the crucial role of complementary downstream 
assets as drivers of firm investment in OSS. Indeed, we show that firms with a strong 
position in the software market are more reluctant to embrace the new paradigm, while 
firms with considerable stakes in the hardware market have a very positive attitude 
towards OSS products. These findings suggest that in a regime of weak IPRs, 
complementarities with other firm assets are key to guarantee the appropriability of 
innovation efforts (Teece, 1986). Hardware producers can customize OSS products to 
their machines, and the overall bundle to their customers’ needs. The investment in OSS 
allows them to increase the value-added of their offerings (Dewan et al., 2003). By 
contrast, established leaders in the software industry have clear difficulties to grasp OSS 
opportunities. As suggested by several scholars, incumbents tend to react slowly and 
late to paradigm shifts and drastic technological changes (Tushman and Anderson, 
1986). The literature has highlighted several explanations that go from incentives 
(Arrow, 1962; Reiganum, 1981) to important organizational reshaping (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990), from inertia (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) to established customers 
networks (Christensen, 1997). Most of them are present in the transition from 
proprietary software to OSS production. Interesting enough, this also confirms the 
serious potential threat that the OSS movement exerts on consolidated leaders in the 
software industry. As the theory predicts, they have been slow in embracing the new 
paradigm. The extent to which OSS production will account for a considerable share of 
all software products is unknown, unpredictable and out of the scope of this paper. 
However, our results point out that if OSS will take off there will be a considerable 
reshaping of competitive positions in the overall software industry. 
Second, our research reveals that technological assets are also crucial drivers of 
OSS product introductions. We interpret these findings as evidence of the importance of 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). However, not all technological 
competences have the same impact on the firm’s level of absorptive capacity. We draw 
on Zahra and George (2002)’s distinction between potential and realized absorptive 
capacity, to argue that while software competences help increase both sets of absorptive 
capacity, hardware competences might correlate negatively to potential absorptive 
capacity. Indeed, hardware and software engineers use different languages and do not 




external knowledge much more difficult (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). The key role of 
absorptive capacity to understand progresses and trends within the OSS communities 
has also practical relevance for firms attempting to cope with the new paradigm for 
software production. Indeed, previous research has shown that proprietary software 
firms allow their engineers to contribute to the OSS communities as a means to monitor 
external knowledge development and to build the necessary absorptive capacity to 
exploit potential opportunities (Lerner and Tirole, 2002). 
Third, our paper also contributes to the literature on the dynamics of industries 
characterized by network externalities (Shapiro and Varian, 1998; Gandal et al., 1999). 
Operating systems are especially subject to strong network effects. The larger the 
number of users adopting a given operating system, the stronger the interest of 
application suppliers to develop software products especially tailored to that operating 
system. In turn, a larger portfolio of applications makes the operating system more 
valuable to consumers. Indeed, we find that a strong downstream position in hardware is 
positively associated to the rate of OSS production introductions in operating systems. 
The literature has stressed that the relationship between the software products and the 
hardware machines is the channel through which network externalities take place 
(Shapiro and Varian, 1998; Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1998). In addition, our findings 
reveal that in the applications niche firms that have previously released OSS operating 
systems show a higher intensity of product introduction. This result is consistent with an 
early phase of the OSS market, where, lacking a structured supply of OSS application 
producers, the firms that have launched OSS operating systems show higher incentives 
to release in-house applications in order to increase the value of their operating systems. 
Our contribution in terms of measurements is also worth mentioning. The recent 
literature has provided several exciting ways of using patent data to measure different 
constructs of knowledge (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Jaffe et al., 1993; Stuart and 
Podolny, 1996). Indeed, in this study we used patent accounts to measure the firm’s 
stocks of knowledge in hardware and software. What is more, a real novel contribution, 
we use another large public available data, the US Trademarks dataset, to measure 
firms’ market positions (Mendoca et al., 2004). Previous research has shown that the 
stock of “live” trademarks is highly correlated with the firm’s market share 
(Seethamraju, 2003). A virtue of the measure used in this paper is that it is easily 




portfolios, to make a fine-grained assessment of a firm’s market position. We indeed 
exploit this information to distinguish between hardware and software. 
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides some 
comprehensive empirical evidence on how profit-oriented organizations cope with the 
new paradigm for software production. It goes without saying that there are many 
interesting aspects that we were unable to uncover during this research. These are 
limitations of the present study and natural candidates for future research in this area. 
Specifically, we do not have any measure of the level of openness that is attached to the 
software packages our sample firms have released. We can only trust the fact that the 
firms announced on the specialized press, and to all the OSS community, a release of a 
software product that is claimed to be “open source”. The degree of openness would be 
an important piece of information to understand how firms defend their innovative 
efforts, and profit from OSS products. Related, we do not have information about the 
type of license under which the software product is sold. OSS product can typically be 
modified and resold. However, restrictions are often imposed by the license agreement. 
Such information, when available, could cast new light on the business model and 
commercialization strategies chosen to profit from OSS products. It will also be useful 
to understand the interaction between the firms and the open community of users, 
practitioners and developers. Finally, a direct measure of the performance of OSS 
products, like sales or returns to investment, will be useful to value the actual potential 
of the firms’ strategies, and to carefully disentangle OSS product introductions that are 
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Table 1. Expected effects of firm assets on OSS product introduction intensity 
  Sector components 
 Software  Hardware 
Firm Assets    









Table 2: Sample firms that introduced OSS products between 1980 and 2003 by core sector of 
activity 
  OPSYS Niche  APP Niche 
  Firms  Av. size  
(Empl.)  Firms  Av. size  
(Empl.) 
Electronics  13  42,827 7 34,840 
Hardware  77 11,390 30 24,985 
Software  195 1,155 154 1,368 
Semiconductors  18 9,451  2 39,434 
Telecommunications 12 13,185 11 31,458 
Other  5 283,190 9  6,586 
Total  320 10,636 213  7,927 
N. of products  877  360  
Source: Our elaborations from Infotrac's General Business File ASAP and PROMT database and from 






Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (Means and Standard Errors in parenthesis) for the original 
sample and the control sample 
  Pi=1  
(OSS product introduction) 
 
Pi=0  
(No OSS product introduction) 
 




























































TIME2MKT  40.656 
(.929) 
41.958 
(1.421)  - - 
OPSYS-before
♦   -  0.188 
(0.027)  - - 
APP-before
♦  0.069 
(0.014)  -   







Table 4. Non-linear least squares estimation (corrected standard errors in parenthesis) 
  OPERATING SYSTEMS  APPLICATIONS 
  (1) (2)  (1)  (2) 
TRADEMARKSOFT  -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.024**  -0.037*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)  (0.010) 
TRADEMARKHARD  0.030*** 0.032***  0.023  0.029* 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.014)  (0.016) 
PATENTSOFT 0.014***  0.014***  0.007  0.009 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
PATENTHARD -0.010***  -0.010***  -0.004  -0.006 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.004) 
SIZE  0.000 0.000  0.000**  0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
TIME2MKT  0.033*** 0.034*** 0.007***  0.004* 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
OPSYS-before
♦  -   0.547***  - 
     (0.162)   
APP-before
♦  -0.322 -  -  - 
  (0.209)      
Firm Sector  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Country  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
       
Beta0  -8.942 -9.817 -0.104  0.370 
  (6.622) (6.280) (0.259)  (0.277) 
Theta* 0.409  0.399  -0.464*  -0.856*** 
 (0.549)  (0.562)  (0.258)  (0.257) 
Log likelihood    -845.387 -845.792 -331.435  -339.422 
No. of observations  640 640 426 426 
♦ dummy variables 
*  The significant estimate for the covariance term θ in the Applications niche reflects the presence of 
unobserved factors that are common to the two decisions of the firm. Its negative sign shows that an 






Figure 1: Predicted number of product introductions in OPSYS as a function of the pre-entry stock of 
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Figure 2: Predicted number of product introductions in APP as a function of the pre-entry stock of 







































Search methods and error testing 
We employed two search algorithms for patents and trademarks. The general idea of this 
procedure was to construct algorithms that reduced the probability to fail in identifying a correct 
hardware or software trademark or patent. For patent we searched in the patent abstract the 
following string of words: [“computer software” or “operating system” or “computer program” 
or “software algorithm” or “data processing” or “software application”] for software, and 
[“computer server” “computer hardware” or “motherboard·” or “peripherals” or “workstation” 
or “mainframe” or “disk driver” or “area network”] for hardware. For the trademarks, we used 
the same algorithms in the trademark description of goods and services.  In order to validate the 
accuracy of these algorithms, we compared the results of our search against a random sample of 
200 patents and trademarks which a software engineer had read and classified into software/no 
software, hardware/no hardware patents and trademarks. With a conservative approach, we 
selected the random sample inside the general electronic technological and product classes 
excluding too distant classes (like food, textile, firearms…for more details see the USPTO 
technological and product classification, www.uspto.gov). The error percentages are listed 
below. From 107 non-software patents, this algorithm spotted 23 patents (21.4%) as software 
patents. From 93 software patents, 8 patents (8.6%) escaped from the algorithm search. 
Similarly, from 84 non-software trademarks 12 (14.2%) were include as software and from 116 
software trademarks 9 (7.7%) escaped. For hardware, from 104 non-hardware patents, we had 
16 errors (15.3%) and from 96 hardware patents we had 9 errors (9.3%). From 124 non-
hardware trademarks, we had 18 errors (14.5%) and from 76 hardware trademarks we had 6 
errors (7.8%). As expected, errors for hardware are less severe than for software and errors in 
trademarks are less severe than in patents. Overall, the error percentages are similar to Bessen 
and Hunt (2003) and seem reasonably acceptable.  
 
Table A. Examples of software/hardware patents and trademarks 





Word Mark LANGUAGEWARE  
Goods and Services: Computer software 
for use in processing natural language text, 
namely, an application designed to 
perform a set of linguistic functions to 
process natural language… 
Serial Number 78203799  
Filing Date January 15, 2003  
Owner  International Business Machines 
Orchard Road Armonk NEW YORK 
10504 
Word Mark 1350  
Goods and Services … computer 
hardware; computers; servers; computer 
connection cabling; computer network 
hubs, switches and routers; computer 
networking hardware… 
Serial Number 78579881  
Filing Date March 3, 2005 
Owner  International Business Machines 





Title Real-time evaluation of compressed 
picture quality within a digital video 
encoder  
Abstract Method, system and computer 
program product are provided for real time 
evaluation of compressed picture quality, 
in hardware, software or a combination 
thereof, during encoding of a sequence of 
video data… 
Assignee:  International Business 
Machines Corporation (Armonk, NY)   
Appl. No.:  020904  
Filed:  February 5, 1998 
Patent Number  6,252,905   
Title Computer equipment having an 
earthquake damage protection mechanism  
Abstract Relatively heavy electrical 
equipment, such as a computer mainframe 
or server unit, is provided with a 
mechanism which prevents and/or 
mitigates damage to the equipment caused 
by seismological or other activity… 
Assignee:  International Business 
Machines Corporation (Armonk, NY)   
Appl. No.:  457216  
Filed:  December 9, 1999 
Patent Number  6,134,858 
 